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DON CLYDE and KATE CLYDE, his 
13 wife; LARRY F. CLYDE and BARBARA 
CLYDE, his wife; LOUIS A. KIRK and 
JANE KIRK, his wife; JAMES F. 
CLYDE and EARLENE CLYDE, his wife; 
ROBERT CLYDE and LYNETTE 
Ill CLYDE, his wife, 
13 
13 
Respondents. 
Case No. 
11148 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
For purposes of consistency, we will use herein the 
lower court designations of the parties as plaintiff and 
IS 
defendant. Plaintiff is the appellant and defendants are 
20 the respondents in this court. 
From the beginning, the nature of plaintiff's case has 
not been entirely clear and we do not believe it is easily 
discernible upon this appeal. 
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Originally, plaintiff's complaint sought to quiet title to: 
"All rights to fishing in or around or in the vicinity 
of Deer Valley Reservoir ... (and) the same right i 
in to and around the vicinity of Witt Lake located in ! 
Section 10, Township 4 South, Range 6 East, Salt Lake I 
Meridian ... " (Italics supplied) 
No particular land w::is described in the complaint, and 
the fact that the defendants owned all of the land around 
the Deer Valley Reservoir and Witt Lake was not then and 
has never been in dispute. 
At the conclusion of its evidence the trial court permit-
ted plaintiff to amend its complaint by interlineation to 
"conform to the evidence," and to delete from the complaint 
all reference to "Deer Valley Reservoir." (Tr. 130, 150-156) 
The evidence to which the complaint was amended to con· 
form was not specified. The apparent effect of the amend· 
ment was the addition of a description of the land under 
Witt Lake, the removal from the lawsuit of any claims con· 
cerning Deer Valley Reservoir, and a deletion from the 
complaint of all reference to "rights to fishing." Never· 
theless, plaintiff now says on page 22 of its brief that the 
"entire case from the filing of the complaint to this appeal 
has been whether defendants have acquired any right WI 
water or any rights to fish." 
Denying defendants' motion to dismiss made upon the 
ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify any 
relief to the plaintiff, the trial court then granted time 
to defendants to further study the effect of the amendment I 
and to file an amended answer and couuter-claim if defend· I 
ants decided to do. An amended answer and counte1· I 
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claim was then filed by defendants in which they sought: 
(1) to quiet title to fishing rights in Witt Lake, and (2) 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, to have the court 
declare to be valid an agreement dated March 31, 1959, 
between the parties and a quit claim deed from plaintiff to 
defendants of the same date (Plaintiff's Exhibits 7 and 8) 
which had settled many matters of controversy between the 
parties, including fishing rights in Witt Lake, some six 
years prior to the commencement of this lawsuit. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court held generally for the defendants on 
l j their counter-claim (R. 28-29, 32-36), and as basic proposi-
t tions, ruled as follows: 
r 
( 1) That plaintiff has those rights in the land under 
Witt Lake and in the irrigation water stored thereon which 
the deed and decree under which it claims provides. 
. I (2) That as between plaintiff and defendants, title to 
I fishing rights in Witt Lake is in defendants. 
e 
(3) That as a matter of declaratory judgment, the 
agreement and quit claim deed dated March 31, 1959, 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 7 and 8) "were and are validly 
~ executed." 
y 
ie 
( 4) That defendants are entitled to judgment against 
plaintiff in the amount of $250.00 for attorneys fees under 
Rule 41(a) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in connec-
tion with the amendment of plaintiff's complaint during the 
I course of trial. it 
l· I 
r· I 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
trial court recognized that the agreement and deed above 
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ref erred to had been executed by the president and secretary 
of plaintiff corporation without a formal resolution of the 
board of directors authorizing the execution thereof, but 
concluded, among other things, that the agreement and 
deed were, nevertheless, binding upon the corporation by 
reason of a ratification by the board of directors, and it 
being now estopped to claim invalidity thereof. Among ! 
other findings, the trial court determined that at least 
three of the five members of the board of directors person· 
ally participated in performance under the agreement and 
had knowledge that an agreement of settlement of many 
matters of controversy between the plaintiff and the defend· 
ants had been reached. The court determined as both fact 
and law that the directors had failed to inform themselves 
as to the particulars of the settlement agreement, although 
doing work thereunder, and in that respect did not use due 
diligence required of them as directors necessary to shield 
the corporation from liability. The court also concluded that 
the plaintiff corporation had accepted the benefits under 
the agreement for more than six years, and did not repudi· 
ate the same until shortly before its lawsuit was commenced. 
In addition, the court found, and it was freely admitted 
by plaintiff's witnesses, that the corporation had paid 
attorney Glen Hatch $160.00 for legal services performed 
in drafting the agreement, about which it claimed that 
it had no knowledge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendants believe the trial court was correct in its 
judgment and request the Supreme Court to so affirm. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The recitation of facts by the plaintiff are generally 
correct insofar as they reflect part of the testimony of par-
ticular witnesses. However, in our view, they are incomplete 
to properly present the law matters to the court, and for 
the convenience of the court, the findings made below which 
are generally not disputed, are set forth verbatim: 
"l. That plaintiff's rights in and to the land under 
Witt Lake described in plaintiff's Amended Complaint came 
from John E. Moulton and Isabell Moulton by mesne con-
veyances; that in the warranty deed from the Moultons 
dated November 14, 1911, received in evidence as defendants' 
Exhibit 15, the following reservations were made: 
'The said grantors hereby reserve the right to use 
for grazing purposes all such part of the above-de-
scribed land as shall not, from time to time, be covered 
with water for reservoir purposes, it being understood, 
however, that the grantee, his heirs, or assigns, shall. 
at all times hereafter have the right to cover all, or any 
portion, of the lands with water for reservoir purposes. 
'And it is further reserved by the grantors that 
the said land shall not be fenced so as to exclude the use 
thereof by the said grantors for grazing purposes, and 
for watering stock at the reservoir now constructed 
or that may hereafter be constructed thereon.' 
''2. That defendants are the owners of all of the land 
surrounding Witt Lake and their title to such lands also 
came originally from John E. Moulton and Isabell Moulton 
by mesne conveyances. 
"3. That the water covering said land to form Witt 
Lake comes from Lake Creek, a public stream, and by a de-
cree of this court entered in 1904, a copy of which was in-
troduced in evidence as plaintiff's Exhibit 5, plaintiff was 
awarded certain irrigation rights in said Lake Creek water. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"4. That from time to time said lake has been stocked 
with game fish by the Department of Fish and Game of the 
State of Utah, and occasionally over several years, the un-
organized public has angled for fish therein. 
"5. That on or about March 31, 1959, Clyde Ritchie and 
Louris V. Mahoney, who were the president and secretary, 
respectively, of plaintiff corporation, and had been so for 
many years, ex~.:uted and delivered to defendants a written 
agreement identified as plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7, and a 
quit claim deed identified as plaintiff's Exhibit No. 8. 
"6. That no formal resolution of the board of directors • 
of plaintiff corporation authorizing the president and secre- : 
tary to execute and deliver such instruments was entered : 
upon the minutes of the corporation's board of directors. 
I 
"7. That in the spring of 1959, after the execution 1 
and delivery of such instrument, Clyde Ritchie, George 
Holmes and Kenneth Anderson, three of the five members 
of the board of directors, personally participated in per· 
f ormance under the agreement and had knowledge that an 
agreement of settlement of many matters of controversy 
between the plaintiff and the defendants had been reached; 
that said directors apparently failed to inform themselves I 
as to the particulars of the settlement agreement, and did I 
not use due diligence in that regard. 1 
"8. That plaintiff corporation paid defendants' attor· 
ney for preparing the settlement agreement and quit claim 
deed pursuant to the agreement which he prepared. 
"9. That prior to March 31, 1959, all of the directors 
knew defendants asserted a claim against plaintiff corpora· 
tion for the loss of certain lambs, and knew that a settlement 
of said claim had been made, but apparently failed to inform 
themselves as to the particulars thereof; that said directors II 
did not use reasonable diligence in that regard. 
I 
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"10. That plaintiff corporation accepted the benefits 
of the agreement identified as plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7, for 
more than six years, and did not repudiate the same until 
shortly before his lawsuit was commenced. 
"11. That defendants' attorneys addressed letters to 
the plaintiff corporation pertaining to the agreement and 
quit claim deed and responses to said letters were made by 
the president and secretary thereof; that said corporation 
maintained no office for the transaction of its business and 
there is no evidence that the business of said corporation 
was ever transacted by other than the president and secre-
tary thereof. 
"12. That it is reasonable and proper that defendants 
be awarded the sum of $250.00 attorney's fees as a condition 
1 to permitting plaintiff to amend its complaint during the 
course of trial." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DELINEATED 
THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF IN WITT LAKE. 
It is not disputed that plaintiff's right to the land 
under Witt Lake came from John E. Moulton and Isabell 
Moulton through Alva M. Murdock, and defendants rights 
to all the lands surrounding Witt Lake came directly from 
the Moultons. (Exhibits 3, 13, 15) It is further not dis-
puted that the conveyances by which plaintiff claims the 
land under Witt Lake contain the reservations set forth on 
page 5 of this brief. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 is a copy of the decree of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Wasatch County 
entered in 1904 awarding certain irrigation rights to the 
plaintiff in Lake Creek water. No mention is made therein 
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of any fishing rights, and the decree appears to be the 
typical water right allocation from a public stream. 
By the terms of the very instruments under which 
plaintiff claims, it is apparent that plaintiff's interest in 
the lands described in its complaint is solely the right to 
store Lake Creek water thereon for irrigation purposes .. 
In view of the deed reservations and inasmuch as the titles 
of both parties originally came from a common grantor, 
the trial court was entirely correct in holding plaintiff's 
1 
title to the land under Witt Lake to be subject to the defend· i 
ants' right of grazing, rights to water stock, and right to 
have the land remained unfenced; and this does not seem 
to be seriously disputed by the plaintiff. 
With respect to "fishing rights," it is defendants' posi-
tion that the record is devoid of any evidence whatever 
that plaintiff ever had any "fishing rights,'' and under 
the elementary rule that a plaintiff seeking to quiet title to 
a property right must do so on the strength of his own and 
not on the weakness of his adversary's title, plaintiff would 
not be entitled to any affirmative decree in this regard under 
any circumstances. Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 U. 10, 94 P. 
862; Mercur Coalition Min. Co. v. Cannon, 112 U. 13, 184 
P.2d 341; Home Owners' Loan Corp. 'V. Dudley, 105 U. 208, 
218, 141 P.2d 160, 166. 
Plaintiff introduced some evidence to the effect that 
certain persons who were stockholders in plaintiff corpora· 
tion had fished in Witt Lake for a number of years, which 
evidence was apparently offered for the purpose of showing 
a fishing right in the plaintiff corporation by adverse user 
of some of the stockholders. There is nothing in the evi· 
I .. 
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dence, however, which indicates in any respect that fishing 
which has taken place in Witt Lake has been adverse to 
the defendants. On the contrary, the evidence is to the 
effect that defendants have in past years cooperated with 
the Fish and Game Commission in setting the opening date 
for fishing therein for the general public, and that this co-
operation has been maintained over the years. (Tr. 178-180) 
It is clear from the evidence that whoever fished in Witt 
Lake in the past has presumptively done so as a member 
of the general public and by right of the general laws and 
regulations relating to fish and game as promulgated by 
the Fish and Game Commission, and not as any agent of 
or by right of the plaintiff corporation. 
Additionally, even if it could be shown that the persons 
who fished in the lake over the years were doing so ad-
versely to the defendants, still no right to angle or fish was 
or could be acquired by anyone for the reason that the law 
is well settled that the unorganized public cannot acquire 
the right of fishing in a pond either by grant or prescrip-
tion. Turner v. Hebron, (1891) 61 Conn. 175, 14 LRA 386, 
22 A. 951. And, in Gibbs v. Sweet ( 1902) 20 Penn. Sup. 
Ct. 275, it was held that fishing in another's pond without 
objection will lead to no presumption right. 22 Am. Jur. 
684. 
Furthermore, the evidence is that Witt Lake is fed by 
Lake Creek, which is a public stream, and that neither at 
the point where the water is diverted from Lake Creek into 
Witt Lake, nor the point where waters leave Witt Lake are 
there any traps, screens, or other means to prevent fish 
from either entering or escaping from Witt Lake. (Tr. 173, 
177) In such a case, the law is that fish therein are wild 
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animals owned by the public, and the taking thereof is sub-
ject to control and regulation of the State and not the 
owner of either the water or the land. 22 Am. Jur. 699. 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that plaintiff's 
evidence is woefully deficient to justify any affirmative 
holding in its favor as to fishing rights. 
POINT II 
AS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF, THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY QUIETED TITLE TO FISHING 
RIGHTS IN THE DEFENDANTS. 
There may be some question as to whether the defend-
ants could quiet title to fishing rights transcending the 
powers of the Fish and Game Commission and the general 
statutory laws regulating angling and the taking of game• 
fish; and it is not defendants' pm1)ose in this lawsuit so: 
to do. However, there is no question but that, as against 
plaintiff, defendants' title can be quieted; and it is im·, 
material that there may be transcending powers in others. ; 
Fisher v. Davis, 77 U.81, 84, 291 P. 493. 
I 
For several years prior to 1\farch 31, 1959, defendantl I 
owned all of the land around the lake and conducted lambing I 
operations in the vicinity of the lake, which lambing opera· I 
tions were being seriously interferred with by the public i 
fishing in Witt Lake. (Tr. 170-172) While they never' 
sought to prohibit it, defendants did desire to maintain some 
control over the fishing public, including stockholders of 
the plaintiff corporation, which control was exercised bl 
defendants for a number of years prior to the commence-
ment of this action through cooperation with the Fish and 
Game Commission. (Tr. 178-180) 
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The provision in the agreement of March 31, 1959, 
with respect to fishing rights and the quit claim deed exe-
cuted pursuant thereto, were in pursuance of an objective 
by defendant owners of the land surrounding Witt Lake 
to eliminate any question as to their right to control public 
fishing in the reservoir, including stockholders of plaintiff 
corporation. (Def. Exh. No. 11) It is our position that as 
against the plaintiff corporation, the agreement and quit 
claim deed (Pl. Exhibits Nos. 7 and 8) gave the defendants 
full right and title to control fishing in the Lake, although 
that right might not be absolute as against the Fish and 
Game Commission of the State of Utah. Fisher v. Davis, 
supra. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DECLAR-
ING THAT EXHIBITS 7 AND 8 WERE AND ARE V Al.r 
IDLY EXECUTED. 
The evidence shows that while no formal resolution 
was adopted by the corporation authorizing the agreement 
and quit claim deed introduced in evidence by plaintiff and 
identified as plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 7 and 8, at least four 
of the five directors nevertheless personally participated in 
performance of obligations under the agreement with knowl-
edge that settlement of many matters of controversy with 
the defendants had been made. They, likewise, knew of the 
existence of an agreement of some sort and that they were 
performing under an agreement. (See testimony of directors 
in transcript as follows: Clyde Ritchie, p. 48-49, 61-66; 
Harvey Crook, p. 72-74; George Holmes, p. 103-105; Ken-
neth L. Anderson, p. 116-118. The remaining director, Wil-
liam J. Bond, was an old man and ill, (p. 210). He could also 
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have participated in the work according to the President 
' 
Clyde Ritchie, p. 64-65.) 
In our view, it was, therefore, incumbent upon them . 
as directors, using reasonable diligence in carrying out ' 
their responsibilities, to know the terms of the agreement 
under which the corporation was performing. Their pro. · 
fessed ignorance of the acts of its president and secretary' 
in signing an agreement does not relieve the corporation 1 
from liability under these circumstances. The terms of the 
agreement under which they were personally performing on 
behalf of the corporation were readily ascertainable by any 
director at any time, and their asserted collective failure 
to inquire into or to inform themselves as to the particulars 
thereof, although doing work thereunder with knowledge 
that some kind of an agreement had been reached with the 
defendants, does not shield the corporation from liability. 
19 Am. Jur. 2d 591. Hanover Natl. Bank v. American 
Dry Dock, 148 N.Y. 612, 43 N.E. 72. 
That the corporation had knowledge of the agreement 
and approved it is further shown by the fact that it paid 
Attorney Glen Hatch $160.00 for legal services performe<l 
by him in negotiating the agreement and drafing the instru· 
ments to effect it. It seems to the defendants to be beyond 
question that a corporation which has knowledge sufficient 
to justify its payment of legal expenses for the negotia· 
tion of an agreement of settlement of controversies which 
the corporation has, and for drafting the necessary Jegai 
instruments to effect it, and then performing under the 
agreement, is certainly chargeable with knowledge of what 
that agreement contains. 
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The corporation reecived the benefits of the agree-
ment, including the settlement of the claim for lost lambs, 
which claim would now be barred by the statute of limita-
tions, and which claim all of the directors knew about and 
knew that some settlement thereof had been made. It is 
the well established general rule that a corporation which, 
with knowledge of its officers' or agents' unauthorized 
act or contract and of the material facts concerning it, 
receives and retains the benefits resulting therefrom, there-
by ratifies the whole transaction. See 19 Am. Jur. 2d 611 
and the numerous cases cited therein. 
The reason for the rule is succinctly set forth in 19 
Ain. Jur. 2d at page 660 as follows: 
"The acquiescence of a corporation which will amount 
to ratification of an unauthorized act may be evidenced 
by mere silence under circumstances giving rise to a 
duty to repudiate the transaction; a corporation cannot 
stand by, after it has learned of an unauthorized act or 
contract made or entered into by its officer or agent 
and have its benefit if it would prove to be favorable 
and reject it if it should prove unfavorable. As in the 
case of an individual the principal, a corporation must, 
within a reasonable time after receiving information of 
an unauthorized transaction, repudiate the transac-
tion and restore the proceeds of the transaction, or 
the silence in such respect will constitute strong evi-
dence of ratification or may be sufficient to engender 
a presumption or constitute a prima facie case thereof." 
In the case of Peterson v. Holmgren Land and Livestock 
Co., 12 U.2d 125, 363 P.2d 786, his court held a contract 
therein involved to be binding on the corporation even 
though it was not authorized by the board of directors, 
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and in its opinion quotes with approval the following Ian. 
guage taken from 13 Am. Jur. at pages 871-872: 
"If a corporate officer assuming to contract on behalf 
of the corporation is one to whom authority to make ' 
such a contract may be given, a person dealing with him 
in good faith is not affected by the fact that the, 
proper steps to clothe him with such authority were! 
not taken." 
Plaintiff devotes the major portion of its brief to the 
proposition that it could not validly transfer fishing right.I 
to the defendants without the consent of two-thirds of ill 
stockholders. An examination of the pleadings and the 
record in this matter will show that this issue is raised for 
the first time in plaintiff's brief on appeal. All of plaintiff's 
evidence throughout the lawsuit was directed to its conten· 
tion that Exhibits 7 and 8 were signed by the president and 
secretary of the corporation without authority of a resolu· 
tion of the board of directors. No evidence was offered as 
to who the stockholders were or whether or not they ever 
held a meeting concerning the transfer. The contention now 
advanced that two-thirds of the stockholders must have au· 
thorized the transaction is, therefore, wholly outside the 
proper scope of this appeal. 
More importantly, however, plaintiff's belated conten· 
tion in this regard is simply not supported by the law ana 
is wholly without merit for the reason that Section 16-6·9, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, is not and never has been applic· 
able to the plaintiff corporation. As will hereinafter appear. 
that section applies to religious, social, benevolent, scientific. 
and other corporati01~s not for pecuniary profit. It has never 
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been applicable to corporations for pecuniary profit such 
as the plaintiff corporation. 
The Articles of Incorporation of Lake Creek Irrigation 
' Company (plaintiff's Exhibit 1) indicate that they were 
entered into under an Act of the Legislative Assembly of the 
Territory of Utah entitled "An Act Compiling and Amend-
1 ing the Laws Relating to Private Corporations" approved 
March 13, 1884. The Articles are in the format of Articles 
of a private corporation for pecuniary profit as spelled out 
in the Act, including the provisions for capital stock to be 
owned by stockholders. They do not in any manner follow 
the statutory format of corporations not for pecuniary 
profit. 
Section 2288 s22 of the Act Compiling and Amending 
the Laws Relating to Private Corporations, approved on 
March 13, 1884, read as follows: 
"Relig'ious, social, benevolent, scientific, and other cor-
porations included in Section 1 of this Act when pecuni-
ary profit is not their object, may, in accordance with 
the rules and regulations or discipline of such associa-
tion or institution, elect directors, the number thereof 
to be not less than three nor more than thirteen, and 
may incorporate themselves as provided in this Act." 
Section 2291 s25 of the same Act provides: 
"Corporations organized by members of associations 
mentioned in Section 22 of this Act, may, when neces-
sary for their good, mortgage or sell their real or per-
sonal property; provided, that such mortgage or sale 
must be authorized by a two-thirds majority vote of 
its members present at a duly called meeting for that 
purpose. Such sale may be made by the directors of 
such corporation and the proceeds thereof used as 
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may be provided by the by-laws thereof.' (Italics 
supplied) 
It will be noted from the above that the two-thirds 
majority vote of "members" requirement was applicable 
only to religious, social, benevolent, scientific, and other cor-
p'Orations not for pecuniary profit. There was no similar 
requirement applying to profit corporations with respect 
to "stockholders." 
The Revised Statutes of 1898 mechanically divided the 1 
corporation law into separate sections pertaining to corpo-
rations for pecuniary profit, and corporations not for pecu-
niary profit. Sections 342 through 350 dealt with corpora· 
tions not for pecuniary profit, and Sections 342 and 343 
set forth, with exactness, the manner in which a corporation 
not for pecuniary profit is formed: These latter sections 
provide verbatim as follows: 
"342. Incorporation. Societies and associations where 
pecuniary profit is not their object may be incorpo· 
rated as hereinafter provided. 
"343. Id. Articles. The associates shall meet for or· 
ganization, and the chairman or secretary of the meet· 
ing shall make an affidavit substantially in the follo11" 
ing form: 
'State of Utah 
County of__ _______________ ----------
1 do solemnly swear (or affirm) that at a meetini 
of the members of (insert the name of the churcn 
or society as known before incorporation) residini 
in (insert the jurisdictional limits of the propos~ 
corporation) held at -----------------------·• in the countr 
of ___ -----------·--------· State of Utah, upon notice to th; 
incorporators by (insert a precise statement 0 
the notice given, which in all cases shall be foi 
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not less than 15 days, and in case of societies not 
previously existing, shall be personal to each in-
corporator, and in case of societies already exist-
ing shall be by notice stating the time, place, and 
object of said meeting, published in some news-
paper having a general circulation within the pro-
posed jurisdiction of the corporation, and by no-
tices posted upon the door of each of the usual 
places of meeting, if any, of the society) it was 
decided by a majority vote of the members present 
at said meeting to incorporate said society within 
said limits into a corporation, with such rights 
and obligations as may be prescribed by law, to be 
kno\vn as _____________________________________________________________________ ; 
to exist for ____________ years from the date of incorpo-
ration; for the purpose of (insert object); with 
principal office at _____ ·----------------------------------------------; 
with a board of trustees, (vestrymen, wardens, 
directors, or such other officers as may be decided 
upon, not less than three nor more than twenty-
five in number), consisting of ____________ members, 
of whom ____________ shall form a quorum, to be elected 
(annually or otherwise as may be determined, 
with time and place of election) in the following 
manner: __ -------------------------------------------------------------------• 
and to qualify by each giving bond to the corpora-
tion, to be filed with the secretary thereof, in the 
sum of $------------------------; and (insert the name of 
the officers for the first term, the method of 
adopting and amending by-laws, and of receiving 
and removing members, with such additional 
clauses conformable to law as the incorporators 
may deem necessary or desirable) . 
Signature of Affiant 
Subscribed and s·worn to before me this --------------
day of ________________________________ , 18 ______ .' " 
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Section 344 of the Act then provided that the affidavit 
above set forth should constitute the Articles of Incorpora. 
tion of such society or association and should be filed ana 
recorded in the manner provided for filing and recording 
articles of information for pecuniary profit. 
Then follows Section 347 which prohibits corporations 
not for pecuniary profit from transferring their property 
without the consent of two-thirds of their "members." This 
section reads as follows: 
"The trustees shall have the care, custody, and control! 
of the corporate property, subject to the provisions' 
of the articles of incorporation and by-laws, and may, 
unless otherwise provided in the articles or by-laws, 
upon consent of two-thirds of the members of th1 
corporation present at a meeting duly called and held, 
mortgage, encumber, lease, sell, or convey any real or 
personal property of the corporation, unless such prop-
erty has been received as a gift or devise for some sp~ 
cial purpose, and if so received it shall be used ana, 
applied only for such purpose. Unless otherwise pr~: 
vided in the articles or by-laws, a meeting for such 1 
purpose shall be called upon not less than 14 da)"I 
notice, to be given by publication in some newspaper! 
having general circulation in the place where sucn 
corporation has its principal office, or if there be nu 
such newspaper, then by posting on the door of tht 
usual meeting place or places; such notice shall sta!il 
the time, place, and object of the proposed meeting.', 
(Italics supplied) 
It is obvious from the above that plaintiff corporatiou 
was not originally organized as an non-profit corporation/ 
and is not, therefore, subject to the requirement that tran1: 
fers of property be approved by its "members." · 
.. 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 shows that plaintiff corporation 
was reorganized in 1943, and that the format of the article 
filed at that time was again exactly the format of articles 
for corporations for pecuinary profit, including provisions 
for capital stock and "stockholders," and not "members." 
If it had been intended to make the corporation one not for 
pecuniary profit, the affidavit form set forth above and 
which at that time was still part of the code, would certainly 
have been used; and section 16-6-9 might then have been 
applicable. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED BY SECTION 78-12-25, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, FROM ASSERTING THE 
INVALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENT AND QUIT 
CLAIM DEED DATED MARCH 31, 1959. 
If the incidental purpose of plaintiff's action is to 
accomplish the voiding of the deed and contract executed 
by the president and secretary of the corporation without. 
the knowledge of the board of directors as now claimed by 
the plaintiff, then such action is for affirmative relief. 
Under these circumstances, the case falls within Section 
78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which requires such 
action to be commenced within four years. Brandy v. Salt 
Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153 993. 
As the cause of action to set aside the contract and 
deed arose at the time of making thereof, which was on or 
about March 31, 1959, (recorded August 13, 1959, in Book 
35 at page 379 in the office of the County Recorder in and 
for Wasatch County, Utah), and as the action herein was not 
commenced until June 28, 1965, it is obvious that a period of 
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more than four years, to-wit: more than six years had 
elapsed, and any affirmative relief is barred by the above 
section of the Utah Code. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN AWARD-, 
ING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND 
AGAINST PLAINTJFF FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES UN-
DER RULE 4l(a) (2) OF THE UTAH RULES OFCIVILi 
PROCEDURE. 
At the conclusions of its evidence, defendants moved \II· 
dismiss plaintiff's complaint upon the ground that plain· 
tiff's evidence was insufficient to justify any relief. (Tr. 
154) While this motion was pending, plaintiff moved the 
court for an order deleting all reference in its complaint 
to Deer Valley Reservoir, and the motion was granted. (Tr. 
155) The court denied defendants' request to make the I 
order of dismissal with prejudice. (Tr. 155) Subsequently, 
the trial court denied defendants' motion to dismiss. (Tr. 
158) 
Rule 41 (a) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced1111 1 
provides that after a responsive pleading is filed, an action 
shall not be dismissed at plaintiff's instance save upon order 
of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court 
deems proper. Under this rule, the court can and did aware 
attorney's fees to the defendants in the amount of $250.00 
Plaintiff cites nothing in its brief by way of authorit) 
showing that such an award was illegal or improper in am 
manner. 
22 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the evidence and the law applicable there-
to, we believe the trial court was correct in its judgment 
and decision, and that the same should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. ROBERT BULLOCK 
for 
Aldrich, Bullock & Nelson 
Attorneys for Respondents 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah 
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